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Plugin / local Proxy Mixes
wwwtcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>tail access_log
amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de - - [15/Oct/1997:11:50:01] "GET
/lvbeschr/winter/TechnDS.html HTTP/1.0" - "http://wwwtcs.inf.tu-
dresden.de/IKT/" "Mozilla/3.01 (X11; I; SunOS 5.5.1 sun4u)"
ithif19 logs 17 >finger @amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de
[amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de]
Login       Name               TTY         Idle    When
feder    Hannes Federrath      console             Wed 11:56
>tail syslog
Oct 15 16:32:06 from=<feder@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>, size=1150
Oct 15 16:32:06 to=<hf2@irz.inf.tu-dresden.de>
> Logging and Observation of user actions
Logging of e-mail communication
Logging of web access
Linkage of user actions
wwwtcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>tail access_log
amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de - - [15/Oct/1997:11:50:01] "GET
/lvbeschr/winter/TechnDS.html HTTP/1.0" - "http://wwwtcs.inf.tu-
dresden.de/IKT/" "Mozilla/3.01 (X11; I; SunOS 5.5.1 sun4u)"
ithif19 logs 17 >finger @amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de
[amadeus.inf.tu-dresden.de]
Login       Name               TTY         Idle    When
feder    Hannes Federrath      console             Wed 11:56
>tail syslog
Oct 15 16:32:06 from=<feder@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de>, size=1150
Oct 15 16:32:06 to=<hf2@irz.inf.tu-dresden.de>
> Logging and Observation of user actions
Logging of e-mail communication
Logging of web access
Linkage of user actions
> Anonymity in the Internet is an illusion
z Know your enemy!
÷ Competitors




High frequency radio interception antenna (AN/FLR9)
> Anonymity in the Internet is an illusion
z Know your enemy!
÷ Competitors





















































































• End-to-end encryption of contents
Problem – Traffic data:
Who communicates with whom, how long, where?
Who ist interested in which contents?
We need concepts that hide traffic data (or avoid it).
eavesdropper
>>> Observation of users in switched networks
Confidentiality of content by means of Encryption
z Symmetric Encryption, e.g. DES, IDEA, AES
÷ Both communication partners share a secret key for encryption
and decryption
÷ Security is based on a „chaos machine“
÷ Key length approx 128 bits
z Asymmetric Encryption (Public Key Encryption), e.g. RSA
÷ Each user generates a key pair:
±public encryption key
±private (and secret) decryption key
÷ Security is based on hard problems in number theory
÷ Key length > 1024 bits
new: elliptic curve cryptography approx. 160 bits
z Well-known encryption software:
÷ Pretty Good Privacy
÷ http://www.pgp.com
> Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
http://www.pgp.com
> Protection against observation?
z New challenges:
÷ Privacy in the Internet:
÷ Protection against “Profiling” and commercial use of private data
without consent.
z Part of Privacy; here: confidentiality of traffic data
z Encryption does not help against observation
÷ Who is communicating with whom?
z Anonymity:
÷ The sender and/or recipient stay anonymous to each other.
z Unobservability:
÷ All parties (incl. network operators) cannot trace communication
relations.
÷ Sending and/or receiving of messages is unobservable
z Remarks:
÷ A single event caused by a single user cannot be anonymous or
unobservable.













> Anonymity and unobservability
Everybody can be the originator of an «event» with an equal likelyhood
Assuming a very
strong attacker is
the best way to
achieve real
security.
> Our attacker model
z Attacker may:
÷ observe all communication links,
÷ send own messages,
÷ operate anonymity services (all but one ...)
÷ operate a server (web server)
z Attacker cannot:
÷ break into cryptographic systems,
÷ attack the users personal machine,
÷ has limited time and computing power
Existing systems for HTTP (real-time communication)
z Simple Proxies (partly with filtering functions: Cookies, JavaScript, active content)
÷ Anonymizer.com (Lance Cottrel)
÷ Aixs.net
÷ ProxyMate.com (Lucent Personal Web Assistant, Bell Labs)
÷ Rewebber.com (Andreas Rieke, Thomas Demuth, FernUni Hagen)
÷ Anon proxy (Hannes Federrath)
÷ Each appropriate configured web server with proxy functions
z Systems considering traffic analysis
÷ Crowds (Mike Reiter, AT&T)
÷ Onion-Routing (Naval Research Center)
÷ Freedom (Ian Goldberg, Zero-Knowledge Inc.)
÷ WebIncognito (Privada)
÷ WebMixes (TU Dresden)
> Simple Proxies
z Server has no information about
the real originator of request
z No protection against the
operator
z No protection against traffic
analysis
z Principles for Web access:
1. Form-based
÷ Type in URL
÷ Proxy gets the URL on behalf
of user


















z Proxy gets to know all contents!!!
z Observation is possible
÷ Timing correlation of incoming and outgoing requests
÷ Correlation by message length and coding
÷ Simple encryption between user and proxy is not sufficient
because of the correlation of timing and length and it does not
help against the operator
User U P A
honest
page.html
> Cascading Simple Proxies
z Link-to-link encryption between proxies
z Does not help to avoid observation by operators




kUA(page.html) kAB(page.html) kBC(page.html) kCS(page.html)
z Each communication request is sent directly to the server with a
probability of P
z Else the request is sent to another user (Jondo) of the crowd
(with 1-P)
z Symmetric link-encryption between the users
÷ Avoid linkability
÷ However: timing coincidence
z Enbedded objects (images etc.) are requested by the last Jondo
÷ Suppress bursts of requests
z Security goal:
÷ Every user can deny that
he or she is the originator
of a certain request
z Problem:
÷ Jondos get to know about




z Hiding of routing information in connection oriented communication
relations
z Nested public key encryption
z Uses an expiration_time field to reduce cost of replay detection










US Naval Research Center
> Attacks
z Systems considering traffic analysis have to avoid all of the following
possible attacks
÷ Timing attacks: Observe the duration of a communication by
linking the possible endpoints of a communication and wait for a
correlation between the creation and/or release event at all
possible endpoints.
÷ Message volume attacks: Observe the amount of transmitted
data (i.e. the message length) and correlate input and output.
÷ Flooding attacks: Each message can only be anonymous in a
group of messages (batch). Under normal circumstances, each
sender sends one message per batch. A good system has to
avoid that the batch can be flooded by an attacker in order to
separate a certain message.
÷ Linking attacks: Because of online/offline-periods of the users an
attacker may create intersections of anonymity groups by
observation over a long period.





MIX 1 MIX 2
Mixes (David Chaum, 1981)
z Basic idea:
÷ Sample messages in a batch, change their coding and forward
them all at the same point oftime but in a different order. All
messages have the same length.
÷ Use more than one Mix, operated by different operators.
÷ At least one Mix should not be corrupt.
z Then:
÷ Perfect unlinkability of sender and recipient.










































÷ Use a public key cryptosystem:
÷ ci(...) is an encrypted message for Mix i (everybody can encrypt
messages for Mixes using this function)
÷ di(...) is the private function of Mix i to decrypt messages (only Mix i can
decrypt his messages, nobody else)
÷ Ai is the address of Mix i; ri are random numbers (dropped by the Mix)
÷ M is the message for the recipient (including his address)
MIX 1 MIX 2







Mc(M     )
=?
> Mixes: Why do we need random numbers?
z If no random numbers r used:
÷ Everyone can encrypt the output messages of a Mix because
c(...) is public
÷ Compare results with all incoming messages






>> Mixes: Why do we need random numbers?
z If no random numbers r used:
÷ Everyone can encrypt the output messages of a Mix because
c(...) is public
÷ Compare results with all incoming messages
÷ Need a indeterministic encryption scheme (or use random
numbers)
r never leaves the Mix
The problem of anonymous real-time communication
z Plain Mixes are good for non-real-time communication: E-Mail
z But not sufficient for real-time communication: Web, Ftp, Internet
Phone
÷ Sampling of messages means high delay, because a Mix is waits
for (another) messages the most of time.
÷ Message lengths vary in a very large interval or no support of
connection oriented services





maximal number of messages or timeoutHigh delay in situations
of low traffic:
> Traffic padding
z Hide from the attacker, when a certain communication ends










2. End of communication but users have to
send random data until the last user has
finished his connection
3. However: Nobody knows when the last user
wants to end his communication – because
nobody can distinguish real traffic from
traffic padding
1. Users have to wait until enough users
want to communicate (creation of the
anonymity group)
Example: 5 users
> Time slices and traffic padding
z Chopping of long communications into small pieces (connections or
packet size)
÷ Unobservability in the group of all processed messages at one
time slice
÷ Long communications consist of more than one time slice





z Increase the amount of traffic in situations of low traffic
z Sometimes the number of users is not sufficient to fill the batch.
z This can happen in times of low traffic.
z In that case,
÷ either the use has to wait until enough messages arrive (leads to
likely high delay)
÷ or accepts, that he cannot remain anonymous,
÷ or other users send dummy traffic.
z Def.: Dummy traffic. A user sends messages at all times. When he
doesn’t want to send messages, he sends random numbers. Nobody





z Increase the amount of traffic in situations of low traffic
z Dummy traffic only between Mixes is not sufficient






z Systems considering traffic analysis have to avoid all of the following
possible attacks:
÷ Timing attacks
÷ Message volume attacks
÷ Flooding attacks: Each message can only be anonymous in a
group of messages (batch). Under normal circumstances, each
sender sends one message per batch. Avoid that the batch can
be flooded by an attacker in order to separate a certain
message.
÷ Linking attacks: Because of the online/offline-periods of the
users an attacker may create intersections of anonymity groups





> The Problem of flooding Mixes
z Batch size n
z Flooding: Attacker tries to flood the Mix with his own (n-1)
messages, except one message that he wants to observe
z Attacker knows (n-1) outgoing messages. The only unknown
message is the observed message.
z In that case, the sender and recipient are uncovered.
z Solution (first hack):
÷ All incoming messages need a ticket to be processed by a Mix.
÷ Now, the attacker needs help of the (n-1) other users. However,
we assume the users will never harm themselves.
÷ Very similar to an anonymous payment system.
÷ Digital coin not traceable neither by the Mix nor the Bank.
÷ Additionally, solves the problem of payment for anonymity
systems
> The Problem of long-term observation of users
z Supposed:
÷ A user shows a nearly constant online-offline behavior (from 8 -
10 PM online everyday)
÷ Requests certain contents (web pages, his e-mail account) during
this time
÷ A lot of other people are also online and use the anonymity
service
z Attacker observes all communication links and servers, except the
anonymity service over a long time period.
z Long-term observation leads to intersections of anonymity groups
and uncovers the users behavior.
z How long it takes that an attacker to link the user actions with a high
probability depends on the size of the anonymity group and its
behavior.
z Simulation of that attack
z No good solution at this time to defend this attack.
> Web Mixes: Anonymous real-time communication
z Anonymous and unobservable transport system
÷ Mix-based proxies with additional functions to provide real-time
communication
÷ Should withstand strong (big brother) attacks
z Information service (impossible to operate a perfect Anon system)
÷ Current level of protection (Anonymity level)
÷ Trade-off between performance and protection should be decided
by the user
z Open source, as soon as core functions have been completely
implemented
÷ Client software: Java (platform independent)
÷ Server software: C/C++ (Win/NT, Linux/Unix)
z Technical and jurisdictional knowledge to serve legal issues
z Test application:
÷ anonymous drug counseling site, supervised by an counselor, but
without revealing identities
University of Technology Dresden
> Client software
University of Technology Dresden
JAP.inf.tu-dresden.de
> How does it work?





University of Technology Dresden
Some practical experiences
z First test version has been
launched in October 2000
z Full service has been running since
February 2001
z Hybrid encryption system of 128
bit encryption by AES (Rijndael)
and RSA/1024 bit public key
encryption
z 3 mix casades are running
z Busy hour: 500 users at the same
time are online
z about 5000 – 8000 users
z about 120 gigabyte troughput per
week
JAP.inf.tu-dresden.de
University of Technology Dresden
Browser
Cascade of MIXes:
– real-time deployable MIXes
– different operators
– different locations
– cascade: fixed sequence of servers
– secure against traffic analysis




– independend of Web Mixes System









– constant dummy traffic
– adaptive time-slices
– tickets against flooding












Each client is unobservable
















> Architecture of Web Mixes
University of Technology Dresden
> Time Slice protocol




{Response NIL, wait, Sl, Padding}
{Response Block[i], wait, Sl, Padding}








Create and store Sl
IF (no answer from
Server yet) AND (no
timeout)) THEN send
IF not EOF send
ELSE send
Server
IF not EOF send
ELSE send
> Some remarks about active content
z Deactivate Cookies in your browser
÷ Web server can track all activities of a user
÷ Additional filter software is very useful
±http://www.webwasher.com/
±http://www.junkbusters.com/ijb.html
÷ Filter additional “bugs” that reveal your behavior
÷ Example:very small (1x1) transparent pictures on a
website
z Deactivate all sorts of active content in your browser
÷ Java, JavaScript, ActiveX
÷ IP-Address can be observed by an attacker
÷ Unauthorized access to hard drive by ActiveX
components
> Concluding remarks
z Anonymity and unobservability in the Internet is hard to realize.
z All commercial systems like Anonymizer, Freedom etc. suppose a
weaker attacker model. They base their model on the assumption,
that the strong attacks are not realistic in the Internet.
z In 95 or more percent of observation this assumption may be right,
but not in the remainig 5 or less percent. Let’s give an example of
what we mean:
÷ Assuming that an encryption tool sufficiently encrypts 99 of 100
messages, but in one case the message is sent in clear text. –
Nobody will rely on that tool…
z That is exactly the situation using one of the existing systems.
z However, in some cases (or to defend some attacks) we do presently
not know how a secure system has to be built.
> Political and social context
z Legal enforcement of communications
÷ German Telekommunikationsüberwachungsverordnung (TKÜV)
± http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/download/telekommunikation_post/TKUEV-Entwurf.pdf
÷ European Cybercrime Convention
± http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/projets/cybercrime.htm
z Privacy laws
÷ German (new) Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)
± http://www.bfd.bund.de/information/bdsg_hinweis.html
÷ European directive on privacy protection
± http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html
z Open question
÷ How much privacy (anonymity) is valuable for the society?
>>> Privacy and Anonymity
Anonymous communication secure against traffic analysis
Information online ?
http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/
±Demonstrations
±Downloads
±Links
